Reasons for Action are Unintelligible

Michael Della Rocca (Yale University)

Zoom link: 

https://cuhk.zoom.us/j/97418441588?pwd=UGVFam9qNUFFUG1sVTVrZVEvak9Gdz09

In this paper, I aim to show how a limited and appealing form of rationalism leads to a powerful challenge to the coherence of the very notion of reasons for action, a notion that dominates the landscape of much of modern moral philosophy.  This challenge leads to a conceptual skepticism not only about reasons for action, but also about other allied notions such as the notions of moral criticism, practical authority, practical normativity, and even theoretical normativity and the practical/theoretical distinction.  I will also respond to popular objections to the unpopular position that results, and in so doing, I will illuminate and embrace the paradoxical character of this position.