Omissive Epistemic Akrasia

David J. Alexander (Iowa State University)

Reflective believers sometimes judge the rationality of their beliefs. Sometimes those judgments are positive, like when a double-check confirms that you are thinking clearly. But sometimes those judgments are negative, like when we conclude that our level of confidence is too high or that any degree of belief is irrational. Sometimes we adjust our attitudes in light of such negative judgments. But sometimes we don’t. In the latter case we are epistemically akratic: we continue to hold a belief or attitude despite regarding it as irrational. 

Is it ever rational to be akratic? Or should we never hold an attitude that we judge to be irrational? On this issue epistemologists divide. Some regard holding an attitude one takes to be irrational as a kind of incoherence as bad as inconsistency. Others have argued that if rational mistakes about rationality are possible then epistemic akrasia must be permissible. 

In this paper I explore a unique form of epistemic akrasia: omissive epistemic akrasia. This kind of akrasia involves omitting an attitude one judges required. It contrasts with commissive epistemic akrasia, which involves holding an attitude that one judges impermissible. The paper defends two theses. First, omissive akrasia is unique in that unlike commissive akrasia and inconsistent belief it does not involve any kind of incoherence in belief. Second, the enkratic principles that prohibit omissive akrasia presuppose the existence of positive epistemic duties. That is, omissive akrasia is rationally impermissible only if there are purely epistemic obligations to believe. I contend that since there is good reason to be skeptical of the existence of positive epistemic duties so too there is a good reason to be skeptical that we are required to be enkratic.