Defending the Universal Right to Flee against the Duty to Fight for One’s Nation

Yuichiro Mori (Hokkaido University)

Fleeing is an act to which we have attributed different kinds of moral evaluations. It has been associated with virtues such as prudence. In our legal practices, the law widely recognizes an individual’s interest in fleeing from danger. At the same time, fleeing has been met with moral condemnation; it has often been seen as a sign of cowardice and irresponsibility. Law in our age sometimes restricts our freedom to flee from danger, even against an individual’s will, as we have all witnessed in the recent war in Ukraine.

Here lies the dilemma of the right to flee. Every individual has an interest in fleeing from danger to life and physical security. If so, then no one ought to be prevented from fleeing from danger. However, there are individuals who are unable to flee by themselves. Since life and physical security are equally valuable for all, including these vulnerable individuals, the government also has a positive duty of protecting all from the cause of danger (e.g., invading troops). Unless there are enough volunteers, this could mean that the government needs to coerce its able-bodied citizens to sacrifice their lives and limbs to eliminate the cause of danger (e.g., fight in the battlefields) for the protection of their vulnerable compatriots. If so, then the right to flee ceases to be universal; it would be a right only for the vulnerable (e.g., children, the elderly, and the disabled).

In this presentation, as a solution to this dilemma, I challenge a citizen’s duty to fight for his or her nation and defend the position that everyone (including able-bodied citizens) has the right to flee from danger. First, I clarify the ground and scope of the right to flee, which I defend here. Second, I examine possible arguments for the government’s restriction of the right to flee and coercion of its citizens to fight for their nation, which are based on two of the most promising contentions for political obligation (i.e., a natural duty of justice and fairness). Third, after showing the failure of these, I elaborate further on who ought to discharge what kind of responsibilities to enforce the protection of the right to flee for all in our international society. Finally, I respond to two possible objections to my position.