How we do (not) talk about mistaken beliefs

February 6, 2025 - February 7, 2025
Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf

Haus der Universität
Düsseldorf
Germany

This event is available both online and in-person

Organisers:

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf

Topic areas

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Details

The lexica of natural languages abundantly feature morphologically simple predicates that denote attitudes by which people get things right, for instance factive predicates like know. Yet, as far as we know, they do not regularly feature contrafactive predicates that denote attitudes by which people get things wrong. Indeed, it even remains an open question whether there are any morphologically simple predicates at all that mirror the truth-presupposition or entailment attested with know by having a falsity-presupposition or entailment. Cross-linguistic work has discussed a number of candidate contrafactive predicates (in Cantonese, Daakie. Dutch, German, Kipsigis, Mandarin, Spanish, Tagalog, Taiwanese Southern Min, Turkish, and Washo), but the data collected so far is insufficient to assess whether a no-contrafactive-universal is plausible. To address this, this workshop brings together researchers that are collecting or have collected relevant data from the world’s languages. A second open question is how the difference in the frequency of the two kinds of predicates can and should be explained. This question is not only relevant to linguists, but also to philosophers, as some explanations have significant linguistic and philosophical implications. Proposals that have been explored range from ontological explanations that predict a categorical difference (for instance that there are no suitable entities, ‘contrafacts’, for the complements of contrafactive predicates to denote) to learnability-based explanations that predict a mere difference in degree (e.g., that contrafactive predicates are harder to learn). But the explanations currently on offer still face difficult questions concerning their details and empirical coverage, and it even remains to be seen whether we should give a unified explanation or instead rely on a bunch of different factors. The second aim of this conference will thus be to compare existing explanations, to discuss alternatives that might improve on them, and what, if any, philosophical and linguistic implications follow from the best available explanations.

Programme

6 February

10:00 Richard Holton (Cambridge)
“Knowledge is determinate; mistake less So”

11:00 William MacGregor (Aarhus)
“Expressions of mistaken belief: a prolegomenon  to a typology”

12:00 Lunch

13:00 Tom Roberts (Utrecht) and Deniz Özyildiz (Stuttgart)
“A causal explanation for the contrafactive gap”

14:00 Kilu von Prince (Duesseldorf)
"False beliefs and related notions in cross-linguistic comparison"

15:00 Break

15:30 Emily Hanink (Indiana)
“Two paths to clausal embedding in Wá·šiw”
joint work with Ryan Bochnak

16:30 Lelia Glass (Georgia Tech)
“Truth, common ground, and the factive/contrafactive asymmetry”

7 February 2025

10:00 Simon Wimmer (Duesseldorf)
“Contrafactives and contrafacts”

11:00 Mora Maldonado and Orin Percus (Nantes)
“Another look at contrafactive predicates: The case of Spanish creerse”

12:00 Lunch

13:00 Thorsten Sander (Duisburg-Essen)
“Anti-factives and negation"

14:00 David Strohmaier (Cambridge)  
“Experimenting with contrafactives: adjusting for empirically attested distributions”

15:00 Break

15:30 Madeline Bossi (independent)
“Negative bias, reminding, and pragmatic reasoning in Kipsigis belief reports”

VENUE:

* Participation is possible in-person or online. (Some talks are held online.)
* The in-person venue is Haus der Universität, Schadowplatz 14, 40212 Düsseldorf.

REGISTRATION:

* The deadline to register for in-person attendance without catering is 5 February 2025. The deadline to register for online attendance is 4 February 2025
* Please register by sending an e-mail with the subject header "Registration" to Simon Wimmer ([email protected]). The e-mail must indicate whether you plan to participate in-person or online.
* Participants registered for online attendance will receive relevant links closer to the date of the workshop.
* If you have any queries, you can e-mail [email protected].

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Registration

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February 4, 2025, 11:45pm CET

Who is attending?

4 people are attending:

Australian Catholic University
(unaffiliated)
and 2 more.

1 person may be attending:

Freie Universität Berlin

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