CFP: Towards Comparative Philosophy of Science (Special Issue of the Journal for General Philosophy of Science)

CALL FOR PAPERS: Towards Comparative Philosophy of Science 
(Special Issue of the Journal for General Philosophy of Science)

Guest editors: Simon Lohse (Nijmegen) & Karim Bschir (St. Gallen)

Open for submissions: 1 September 2024 – 31 March 2025

In recent decades, philosophy of science has diversified considerably. This applies not only to the different ways in which philosophy of science is practiced, but also to its subject area. As a consequence, we are increasingly dealing with a fragmented field of different philosophies of the special sciences. Of course, there are still contributions in general philosophy of science, for example on the aims of science and the realism debate, but a large part of current debate takes place within the various sub-disciplines.  This diversity offers a rich reservoir of opportunities for comparison between the different (philosophies of the) special sciences. 

Although there already exist several contributions in the current literature that provide philosophical analyses across disciplines, there is as of yet no integrative debate. The special issue aims to change this by making explicit a latent current in the philosophy of science, thus initiating a new research theme that aims at a systematic comparison of scientific fields (including the social sciences and the humanities) and practices from a philosophical perspective, in short: a comparative philosophy of science. A comparative approach to philosophy of science can generate important insights and promote progress in at least four dimensions: 

Systematic comparison of epistemic and social-epistemic practices:A comparative approach provides us with a rich and nuanced picture of epistemic practices (such as classification, explanation, prediction), as well as social-epistemic practices (such as peer-review) in different disciplines. It enables the identification of relevant similarities and differences of these practices and the factors responsible for these. This may prevent exaggerations of (supposed) differences between disciplines – but also overgeneralisations. It can furthermore provide useful insights for classical topics of general philosophy of science, for example with regards to questions related to demarcation or scientific change, on which the comparative approach allows a fresh perspective. 

Comparative conceptual analysis: A comparative approach enables a better understanding of scientific core concepts such as “objectivity”, “theory”, “model” or “reduction” by highlighting contrasts and analogies across fields. It can also contribute to a refined analysis of the function of these concepts in the different sciences. 

Comparative metaphysics of science: Comparing the role of ontologies or the relationship between theorical claims and ontological commitments in different domains of science (e.g. physical and social sciences) may stimulate novel perspectives in ongoing debates on topics like realism, structuralism or individualism. An example of this a comparative approach to the metaphysics of science would be the analysis of the role of abstract entities in mathematics, literature and legal studies. 

Insights into methodologies and practices in different philosophies of the special sciences: A comparative approach can create insights into philosophical practices. This may facilitate a better understanding of differences in doing philosophy of science by exploring why philosophy of science is sometimes considered more of a reflective meta-discipline and sometimes more as on a continuum with the respective special science.

Accordingly, contributions to these areas are particularly welcome in the special issue. However, other relations could also be explored, including implications of a comparative approach to teaching philosophy of science, to debates on transcultural and globalised philosophy of science, or regarding the role of non-epistemic values and inductive risk arguments in different disciplines. In general, a comparative approach can link strands of discussion that are normally hardly in contact with each other and thus enable new insights.

Possible questions to be addressed in the special issue include, but are not limited to:

• To what extent are concepts like “evidence”, “theory” or others instantiated or used differently in different fields and what does this imply?

• How do attempts to achieve certain epistemic aims (for example predictions) differ across disciplines? 

• To what extent can validity of methodological principles and standards (e.g. evidential standards, statistical norms) be extended from one discipline to another?  

• To what extent and why are idealisations handled differently across disciplines?

• What is the common core of narrative explanations across the sciences? 

• How do peer review procedures in different disciplines differ in epistemic terms?

• What can we learn from comparing ontological commitments of different fields? 

• What field-specific differences are there with regard to the realism/anti-realism debate? What are the reasons for this?

• How can comparative philosophy of science be carried out in a transcultural way? What are the most promising approaches?

• What can we learn from comparing different philosophies of the special sciences about the differences in the philosophicalapproaches and practices of the latter?

• In what ways can comparative philosophy of science contribute to a general theory of science? 

• What are methodological challenges or pitfalls of a comparative approach to philosophy of science?   

• How can comparative philosophy of science inform teaching? 

Please submit your contribution (max. 9.000 words, excluding references) to the Journal for General Philosophy of Science (https://www.editorialmanager.com/jgps/default.aspx). Make sure to select S.I.: Comparative Philosophy of Science as the article type. 

Submissions to this special issue will be reviewed in the same way as regular JGPS submissions. 

For formatting and related questions, please refer to the author submission guidelines: https://link.springer.com/journal/10838/submission-guidelines. Accepted articles from this CFP will be supplemented by selected invited contributions.

For further information, please get in touch with [email protected] or [email protected].