The Explanatory Grounds of De Re Modality

Jennifer Wang (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract:

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke makes a forceful case for the actualist against the so-called “problem of transworld identity”. For certain uses of possible worlds, I think that his response is entirely correct. But if the goal is to provide an elucidation of de re modal truths, then the actualist must take a stance on transworld identity. This is not because there is any deep fact of the matter about the nature of possible worlds, but because the elucidation of de re modal facts in terms of possible worlds is tied to the explanation of de re modality. I further suggest that the actualist should say that an individual’s modal properties are explained by their purely qualitative properties. This view is consistent with actualist motivations, and Kripke’s views in particular.

Link:

https://us06web.zoom.us/j/87649813438