CFP: Phenomenology of (Un)Certainty - Special issue of Methodos: Savoirs et Textes

Special issue of Methodos: Savoirs et Textes

Phenomenology of (Un)Certainty

Journal Website: https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/11103#tocto2n1

Guest editor: Andrea Cimino (KU Leuven)

Paper Proposals Submission Deadline: February 1, 2025

Paper Submission Deadline: June 1, 2025

Special Issue Description

The search for certainty has characterized different positions throughout the history of philosophy, sometimes even assuming a prominent role in defining philosophy itself. For many, philosophy is fundamentally a non-dogmatic response to the challenges posed by those who reject the possibility of rationally attaining any secure knowledge. In other words, philosophy can be seen as a response to any form of skeptical doubt regarding our possibility of reaching any theoretical, axiological, or practical objective truth of which we can be “certain”.

Even today, certainty is at the center of various lines of philosophical research. The analysis of certainty is key in addressing fundamental epistemological problems, such as the epistemic status of truth and how to identify the cognitive sources that successfully warrant our beliefs. A clarification of certainty is also crucial for assessing the capacity of our scientific methods and procedures to perform accurate predictions. This assessment is particularly relevant when confronted by phenomena (whether natural, or social, economic, etc.) characterized by “radical uncertainty”. In such cases, we experience the manifest impossibility of making any justified prediction, as all probabilities are seemingly unknowable. Furthermore, the notions of “practical certainty” and “moral certainty” play important roles in facing the question of justification within the spheres of action, evaluation, and deliberation.

Phenomenological analyses offer refined, yet largely overlooked, descriptions of the different kinds and modes of certainty. For instance, early phenomenological reflections by Brentano and Husserl already distinguish between “pure” and “impure”, “naïve” and “restored” types of certainty, which are carefully linked to the different kinds of “adequate” or “inadequate evidence” and to “defeasible” or “indefeasible validity”. Knowledge is also qualified as being either “mediately” or “immediately” certain. Among “certain truths” (sichere Wahrheiten), one can also discriminate the truths that are endowed with the assertoric “evidence” (Evidenz) of “facts” from those endowed with the apodictic “insightfulness” (Einsichtigkeit) of reasons. In Husserl’s works, moreover, the concept of certainty is extensively investigated as a doxic modality, along with the concepts of doubt, negation, and possibility. On the other hand, Husserl carefully distinguishes the epistemic concept of certainty from the indubitability specifically pertaining to “pure phenomena” that form the research domain of phenomenology as a science. In this regard, a clarification of certainty is not only indispensable for addressing epistemic, moral, and practical questions, but also complementary for a proper understanding of the fundamental concept of phenomenology. And, more recently, Marion develops his critique of epistemology through the new concept of “negative certainty” that operates in “saturated phenomena”.

The journal Methodos: Savoirs et Textes invites submissions for the 2026 issue, Phenomenology of (Un)Certainty, which aims to bring together different phenomenological insights and resources to shed new light on the notions of certainty and uncertainty. The issue welcomes original contributions that address, but are not limited to, the following questions: Can one provide a rich, yet coherent, phenomenological account of the variety of certainty and uncertainty (e.g., psychological, epistemic, moral, practical, etc.)? Is it possible to provide a sound phenomenological clarification of the relations between (un-)certainty and concepts such as evidence, doubt and (in)dubitability, probability, possibility, (in)fallibility, and (in)defeasibility? How can one identify and discern different sources of certainty from a phenomenological standpoint? Is there a possible phenomenological response to the problem of ‘radical uncertainty’?

Paper Proposals Submission Deadline: February 1, 2025

Paper Proposals (2500 characters) for unpublished, original texts are to be sent electronically, in Word or Open Office and PDF formats, to Leone Gazziero ([email protected]) and Alexandre Antolin ([email protected]).

Paper Submission Deadline: June 1, 2025

Once a proposal has been accepted, authors will send their text prepared for double blind review in accordance with the guidelines described under «Author guidelines» (https://journals.openedition.org/methodos/9924). They should also include an abstract of no more than 2,500 characters and a list of relevant keywords.

Accepted languages: English, French, German, Italian.

For information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], or [email protected].