CFP: Special Issue 'Prospects for the Science of Enaction'
Submission deadline: January 27, 2025
Details
CFA: ‘Prospects for the Science of Enaction’
Guest Editors: Russell Meyer, Jodie Russell, Marilyn Stendera
Deadline for Abstracts: January 27th
We are pleased to invite abstracts for contributions to the Special Issue 'Prospects for the Science of Enaction', to be published in Adaptive Behavior.
Invited Contributions:
-
Prof. Randall Beer (Indiana University Bloomington)
-
Dr. Nick Brancazio (University of Adelaide)
-
Prof. Jimena Clavel Vázquez (Tilburg University)
-
Dr. Kate Nave (University of Edinburgh)
-
Prof. Pasquale Stano (University of Salento)
-
Dr. Dave Ward (University of Edinburgh)
Description
Enactive ideas and principles about the nature of life and mind have historically informed and inspired influential work in artificial intelligence and robotics, the psychology of development, and the study of basic principles of biology and cognition. Yet enactivism as a theoretical framework has experienced comparatively little uptake in cognitive science. Scientists have opted to pick and choose commitments, integrating some enactive concepts into their investigations but without embracing an enactive philosophy of nature. A distinctly enactive cognitive science hewing to enactivism’s holistic vision has not emerged (Meyer & Brancazio 2023).
This state of affairs highlights a gap between ideas generated by enactive theorists, and enactivism as an ongoing project. A little over three decades since the publication of The Embodied Mind, enactivism has inherited the project begun by Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela – to develop a biologically-grounded account of cognition that departs from traditional computational theories. Since then, enactivism has presented itself as a serious shift in the cognitive sciences towards a new ontology of life and mind (Meyer & Brancazio 2022). However, its efforts have focused on internal critique and the expansion of its alternative philosophy of nature in rivalry with mainstream philosophy of cognitive science. The utility of enactive ideas for solving problems in cognitive science has consequently been de-emphasised.
This special issue seeks contributions that illuminate possible paths ahead for enactive ideas as theoretical resources for scientific progress:
-
What contributions do enactive ideas like autopoiesis, structural coupling, autonomy, embodiment, have to offer scientific research right now? What new and emerging frameworks can they contribute to directly?
-
Do enactive ideas have a future role in solving problems in specific fields like artificial life, artificial intelligence, psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience?
-
What approaches, traditions and research programs offer interesting ways to think about cognition that marry up with the goals of the enactive project?
-
Is there an investigative benefit to maintaining enactivism as a distinct -ism? Does enactivism offer a distinct research tradition, or something else?
-
Do enactive reappraisals of the role of the observer, and the perspectival nature of science, have something to offer contemporary problems in the sciences?
Submission Guidelines
We are seeking submissions of abstracts of no more than 300 words by January 27th. Please submit abstracts to Russell Meyer ([email protected]) with the subject line ‘Prospects CFA’. Authors whose abstracts are accepted will be invited to submit a manuscript to be published in the special issue.
Deadline for Abstracts: January 27th
Authors Informed: February 7th
Manuscript Due: June 16th