Imprecise Probabilities in Statistics and Philosophy

Imprecise probabilities offer a model of uncertainty that is more general, less idealised than the standard precise probability framework. Imprecise probabilities are receiving increasing attention in statistics (as well as in artificial intelligence and in economics). Recently, there has been a resurgence of philosophical interest in these generalised models of uncertainty. The aim of this workshop is to bring together philosophers and statisticians to see what we can learn from each other. We are sure that such interdisciplinary collaboration will be valuable both to philosophers and to statisticians.

Topics on which we might expect fruitful discussions include:

- updating imprecise probabilities and dilation;
- foundations of imprecise probabilities;
- procedures for eliciting imprecise probabilities;
- decision making with imprecise probabilities.

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS: Fabio Cozman (São Paulo), James M. Joyce (Michigan), and Teddy Seidenfeld (CMU)

ORGANIZERS: Thomas Augustin, Seamus Bradley, Marco Cattaneo, Stephan Hartmann, and Roland Poellinger