Epistemic Advantage, Revisited

Does experiencing oppression provide an epistemic advantage or an epistemic disadvantage?

The notion of epistemic advantage has remained a point of contention in the field of social epistemology and, more recently, the field of epistemic injustice. Views vary: does oppression leave those who are marginalized with a lack of epistemic resources to understand the world? Or, on the contrary, do the oppressed, by virtue of experiencing oppression, have some kind of knowledge about society that is unavailable to those who oppress them?

While the former view followed from Miranda Fricker’s influential account of hermeneutical injustice, authors such as Kristie Dotson, Gaile Pohlhaus and Nora Berenstain have argued that it is often not the case that the marginalized lack resources to understand their own experiences: the problem is rather that those in privileged positions are unwilling to take up these resources. Within the field of epistemic injustice, these criticisms have motivated a recovery of the inversion thesis, namely, the thesis that, due to their distinct experience of the social world, the oppressed have an epistemic advantage over their oppressors, an idea which was already present in feminist standpoint theory and postcolonial thought. However, recent discussions of epistemic advantage either deny or relativize the inversion thesis in order to avoid an epistemology of deference that could be vulnerable to elite capture (Táiwò 2022). Relatedly, recent discussions have centered on whether and how the claim of epistemic advantage is used to reinforce or challenge epistemic hierarchies? In relation to which system of knowledge do we speak of an epistemic “advantage” or “disadvantage”? This has led to the following question: is the notion of epistemic advantage useful at all?

These tensions can be puzzling, as both the idea of epistemic advantage and disadvantage seem to be supported by accounts of epistemic injustice across different traditions that are broadly concerned with the epistemic impact of oppression. The aim of this workshop is then to explicitly thematize these tensions and bring the discussion on epistemic advantage to the forefront. Highlighting this concept and giving it due attention can have far reaching consequences not only for the fields of standpoint theory and epistemic injustice but for any field in which the notion of epistemic (dis)advantage is somehow implicit. This workshop welcomes contributions from all fields of philosophy that deal in various ways with social epistemology. Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

• The notion of epistemic advantage
• Do oppressors also have an epistemic advantage when it comes to oppression?
• What provides the oppressed/oppressors with an epistemic advantage?
• What kind of knowledge does the epistemic advantage of the oppressed/oppressors afford?
• Epistemic advantage and epistemic exploitation
• Epistemic advantage and elite capture
• Epistemic advantage and epistemic systems
• Accounts of epistemic advantage by philosophy of mind
• Consequences of epistemic (dis)advantage
• The notion of epistemic disadvantage
• (Moral) responsibility and epistemic (dis)advantage
• Epistemic advantage and hermeneutical injustice
• Epistemic advantage and post- and decolonial philosophy
• Epistemic advantage and false consciousness
• Alternative ways of knowing and epistemic advantage
• Embodied epistemic advantage

Accepted submissions will be offered the possibility of publishing in a special issue on the same topic of epistemic advantage. More details on this TBA.

The CoGS project will cover two nights’ accommodation and a contribution towards travel costs for all accepted speakers.

Please submit your abstract (1000 words) through this form: https://forms.gle/mQssRFKXeDN5JTzv7, by March 1st 2025. Acceptance will be notified on April 1st.

If you have any questions, please contact us at [email protected] or [email protected]. 

This workshop is funded by the SERI-funded ERC Starting Grant Project “Collective Guilt and Shame” (CoGS).