Philosophy of science by all means: animals, machines, ideology, and the public. A workshop with Angela Potochnik

Program

13,30 --- Arrival and coffee

14,00-14,30 --- Science, values, and the interspecies question by Claudia Cristalli

14,35-15,05 --- Cognition-hype in AI and what we can do about it: insights from comparative cognition by Diego Morales Pérez

15,05-15,15 --- Short break

15,15-15,45 --- Marx, Mill, and the loss of ideology in the philosophy of science by Thijs Ringelberg

15,45-16,15 --- Coffee break

16,15-17,15 --- Science and the Public by Angela Potochnik

***

Abstracts

Science, values, and the interspecies question -- It has recently been argued that “scientists (and philosophers) hold a responsibility (moral and epistemic) for the concepts and methods they develop” (Ratti & Russo 2024, 8), since science is a practice that shapes and constructs our values. Feminist scholars have long posed the question, Whose values?, and standpoint epistemologists have emphasized the situatedness of knowledge previously deemed universal. In this talk, I explore the potential consequences of broadening the standpoint platform to include the perspectives of non-human animals in the production of knowledge and its associated values. I will ground my observation in discussions on the nature and functioning of the ongoing mutualism between human populations and a species of bird known as “honeyguide.”

*

Cognition-hype in AI and what we can do about it: Insights from comparative cognition -- This talk examines what I call 'cognition-hype in AI', a communication phenomenon that leads to exaggerated or unsubstantiated claims and expectations about cognition in artificial agents. To mitigate its risks, I propose an admissibility criterion for cognitive terms in AI, drawing from the stratified method used to warrant cognitive hypotheses in comparative cognition.

*

Marx, Mill, and the loss of ideology in the philosophy of science -- In this talk I argue that the rise of economically inspired modelling techniques in the philosophy of science (PoS) has gone hand in hand with a decline in interest in more ideological aspects of (the philosophy of) science. In order to understand this development I examine the history of the economic approach to PoS. I trace the loss of ideology to a strange alliance at the heart of this approach: a combination of Marxist ideas about the priority of base over superstructure delivered to PoS by the sociology of knowledge, and Millian ideas about non-paternalism embedded in economic modelling techniques. In the face of this analysis I raise the question: should modern PoS attempt to regain ideology, and if so, how?

*

Science and the Public -- Science is a product of society: in its funding, its participation, and its application. In this talk, I outline a strong view of the obligations that science's institutions bear to the public in virtue of this dependence. I then explore how expanded participation in science—diversified professional as well as the participation of amateurs or non-academics in scientific research—can contribute to public trust of science. I suggest that such expanded participation can give rise to what we might call “responsive science,” thereby helping scientific institutions discharge their obligations to the public.