CFP: The Contradictory God: Paraconsistent and Glut-Theoretic Approaches to Theology

CALL FOR PAPERS

TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology  

THE CONTRADICTORY GOD: Paraconsistent and Glut-Theoretic Approaches to Theology  

Guest editors: Daniel Molto (University of Sussex) and Ricardo Sousa Silvestre (Universidade Federal de Campina Grande)  

When confronted with the claim that a particular concept of God is contradictory, philosophers and theologians typically respond by attempting to resolve the apparent contradiction and demonstrate that the concept of God in question is consistent. The reason this move has been standard is that a number of assumptions are often made, tacitly or explicitly, by philosophers of religion and theologians. One assumption is that the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC) is true. A second assumption is that, if LNC is true, then it is false and only false that there are (or there can be) any true contradictions. A third assumption is that there are not non-trivial contradictory theories. The last of these is derived from the logical principle known as ex falso quodlibet, or the principle of explosion (PE), which asserts that any proposition follows from a contradiction.

However, these assumptions have been challenged in recent years by dialetheism and glut-theoretic approaches in general, and by paraconsistent logics. This has led to the emergence of an alternative position which is starting to gain interest among philosophers of religion: rejecting the need to demonstrate the consistency of the concept of God in question and instead defending what might be called the Contradictory God Thesis. In its weakest form, the contradictory God thesis asserts that a contradictory concept of God is philosophically tenable. In its strongest form, it claims that God is a contradictory entity. Either way, the thesis raises significant logical questions: What logical grounds are there for rejecting a contradictory concept of God as philosophically untenable? In particular, what are the relations between the several formulations of the LNC, which might include PE, and the standard criticisms against contradictory concepts of God? What moves are available to defend oneself from such criticisms? How do these moves relate to these several formulations of the LNC? And how paraconsistency and glut-theoretic approaches stand in relation to them?  

Notice that what goes for God, goes also for other theological concepts, so that the scope for glutty and paraconsistent theology extends far beyond those traditions that are committed to a personal and creator God. Many possible theological applications for paraconsistency and glut theory are as yet unexplored. The goal of this special issue of TheoLogica on glutty and paraconsistent theology is to bring together high-quality papers that engage with these thought-provoking philosophical issues. In addition to the questions above, topics of interest include, but are not limited to:  

• The logic of the concept of God;

• Contradictory theologies;

• The role of LNC and PE in theological discourse;

• Paraconsistent and paracomplete approaches to the concept of God;

• Glut-theoretic, gap-theoretic and dialetheic approaches to the concept of God.

• Contradictions and paradoxes in world religious traditions;

• The role of contradiction in the philosophical debate on the concept of God and the rationality of theistic belief.  

Deadline for submission: December 1st, 2025.  

Full papers should be submitted via our website: https://ojs.uclouvain.be/index.php/theologica/index. Visit the TheoLogica homepage for a description of the journal and instructions to authors.  

Sincerely yours,  

Daniel Molto (University of Sussex) & Ricardo Sousa Silvestre (Universidade Federal de Campina Grande)