MANCEPT workshop in Political Theory and Mental Health

Over the last few decades, there has been increased interest in the philosophy of psychiatry, and psychiatric disorders. Similarly, there are now two rapidly developing new philosophical sub-fields: (1) Mad philosophy, which centres the perspectives of the Mad / mentally ill (Jeppsson and Chappell, forthcoming); (2) (critical) neurodiversity studies (Chapman 2024), some of which is explicitly philosophical.

This workshop aims to support the development of a similar level of interest in the political, social and ethical aspects of mental health and illness, Madness and neurodiversity. Broadly, we are concerned with people, who as Schramme (2024) puts it have “minority minds”. This maps broadly but not exactly on diagnosable mental disorders listed in the DSM-5 or ICD-11, thus encompassing both mental disorders such as depression or schizophrenia, and neurodiversities such as autism or dyslexia.

Currently these issues are only routinely raised in clinical ethics, and as test cases in moral philosophy (e.g. in agency and responsibility). Yet many mentally unwell and neurodivergent people live full lives, participating in society. We can raise the same kinds of question about their social lives as we can for women, queer people or racialised people. Just as other minoritised groups, they are frequently subjected to oppressive practices, discrimination, and even state violence.

Possible topics include, but are not limited to:

- Madness and political philosophy: Where “Mad” is understood as an identity similar to Queer, again overlapping with but not identical to current ideas about mental disorder, often with liberatory connotations.

- The state and mental health: How can we balance paternalism and neutrality in interactions between the state and neurodivergent citizens / citizens with mental illness? To what extent is mental illness a response to problems of living and injustice and what can the state do to rectify such situations? Are policies for the prevention of mental illness necessarily paternalistic?

- Mental disorder and citizenship: When can we justify the exclusion of the mentally ill from political life, and what kind of exclusions may be justified? Should people sectioned in hospitals, be allowed to vote, for example?

- Mental health treatment: How do we ensure that treatment for mental health problems is neutral towards conceptions of the good life? How should we conceptualise recovery / living a full life in the context of mental illness /neurodivergence? What ethical problems are raised by specific mental health disorders e.g. eating disorders?

- Mental health promotion: To what extent should states explicitly promote good mental health, and wellbeing, as opposed to preventing mental disorder? What would this imply for prenatal screening, for example? What are good mental health, and emotional wellbeing in the first place?

This workshop is part of the 2025 MANCEPT workshops in political theory. Please register for MANCEPT if you would like to attend.