CFP: Special Issue Argumenta: Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy

Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy

Timothy Williamson’s Overfitting and Heuristics in Philosophy (OUP, 2024) presents new methodological challenges to philosophical debates. In this book, Williamson argues that, just as in the sciences, overfitting theories to data is a source of problems in philosophical theorizing.

Overfitting is a notion that has been developed in the analysis of empirical data, and it is a way to make precise the principle that we should select simpler models of data over more complex ones. Heuristics are rules of thumb for solving problems. They can be automatic, meaning that they are unconsciously performed, or deliberate. In psychology, there is a large literature on the role that heuristics play in our cognition.

Philosophy employs intuitions as its data. However, these intuitions may be the result of mistaken judgements that are elicited by our reliance on heuristics. When we attempt to account for all intuitions, without considering that they may be the result of fallible heuristics, we may face overfitting. A symptom of overfitting in philosophy is the proliferation of conditions that increase the complexity of accounts and serve the purpose of accounting for intuitions elicited by special cases.

Williamson argues that we can find instances of overfitting in philosophy in many debates concerning metaphysics, philosophical logic, and semantics. However, given the widespread reliance on intuitions, Williamson’s methodological challenges are relevant for philosophy overall.

Goals

In this special issue, we aim to foster the debate on overfitting and heuristics in philosophy by gathering articles on the topic. We consider both articles that directly address the cases discussed by Williamson and articles that extend this topic to new cases or sub-fields of philosophy.

We intend to reserve space for high-quality contributions selected through a call for papers. The list of topics we are interested in includes but is not restricted to the following questions:

    1. Questions concerning overfitting and the principle of parsimony

– Does overfitting improve our understanding of the principle of parsimony?

– How can we make sense of overfitting as a statistical notion in the context of philosophy?

– Can we use formal modelling as a way to make precise the degree of freedom of philosophical theories?

    2. Questions concerning philosophical idealizations and overfitting

– Can we achieve idealization without overfitting?

    3. Questions concerning heuristics and intuitions

– What is the role of heuristics and intuitions in philosophy?

– Can we avoid intuitions that rely on heuristics?

Guest Editors: 

Filippo Ferrari (University of Bologna)

Filippo Riscica (University of Bologna)

Confirmed Invited Contributors

Alexander Bird (Cambridge)

Igor Douven (CNRS – Paris)

Alison Hills (Oxford)

Mark Jago (Nottingham)

Jennifer Nagel (Toronto)

Jessica Pepp (Uppsala)

Daniele Sgaravatti (Bologna)

Timothy Williamson (Oxford)

Alessandro Torza (Parma)

Important dates

Deadline for submission: September 30, 2025

Notification of acceptance: January 30, 2026

Word limit: about 8,000 and no more than 10,000 words.

Submission link: https://www.argumenta.org/ojs/index.php/argumenta/about/submissions

Further information: [email protected]; [email protected].