Heidegger – Dreyfus and McDowell

Andrew Inkpin (University of Melbourne)

This talk will focus on the nature of prereflective practical agency that formed the focus of recent debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about the role of concepts in skilled performances – performances that may appear not to require cognitive effort. I begin by outlining my own reading of Heidegger’s view of articulate disclosure in Division I of Being and Time, highlighting particularly its distinction between prepredicative and predicative ways of grasping the world. I then show how this view both differs from and is more philosophically plausible than the notion of nonconceptual ‘coping’ that Dreyfus attributes to Heidegger. Finally, I consider the challenge McDowell’s conceptualism appears to pose to my own reading of Heidegger. I argue that this challenge dissipates once we attempt to unpack the notion of conceptual form or shape that McDowell appeals to.