Primitive Normativity as a Condition of UnderstandingHannah Ginsborg (University of California, Berkeley)
part of:
Conceptual Dogmatism: Epistemology and Ethics of Consciousness Raising
Vienna
Austria
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- FWF Cluster of Excellence "Knowledge in Crisis"
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ABSTRACT: This paper is part of a larger project which is aimed at challenging the view that the notion of normativity is essentially connected to that of reasons. I offer a counterexample to that view in the form of what I call “primitive normativity”: a kind of pre-rational normativity whose recognition is developmentally prior to the recognition of other forms of normativity, and which—at least on a common understanding of rules as items of intentional content—cannot be made out in terms of conformity to rules. I present the idea of primitive normativity in the context of children's early language-learning and concept-acquisition, but I also argue that the recognition of primitive normativity is required for adults' understanding of words and grasp of concepts.
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