Phenomenology and the perception/sensation distinction

Husserl famoisly distinguished  between sensuous stuff (hyle) and intentive form in perception. Merleau-Ponty drew an analogous distinction between perceptual meaning and perceptual matter, and Heidegger distinguished between what is given in a look and what is given in a seeing of what things are.

The broad issue at stake here, i.e. whether there is a distinction between a more sensational and a more narrowly perceptual aspect to sense perception, and, if so, in what terms it should be understood, has been much contested in both analytical philosophy and the phenomenological tradition.

This workshop will feature recent perspectives on how such thinkers as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, or others in the phenomenological tradition, have conceived of this issue. Though the primary emphasis will be on phenomenological tradition, we welcome approaches to the topic that engage with or bring out their bearing upon views within analytical philosophy of perception.

If you would like to present your work at this workshop, please send an abstract (no longer than 1000 words excluding references) to [email protected]  by 15 October 2025.