CFP: TOPOI - SI "Capacities-first philosophy"

CFP "Capacities-first philosophy", TOPOI


Paper submissions are invited for the special issue/collection of Topoi entitled: CAPACITIES-FIRST PHILOSOPHY. This special issue aims to analyze various models of “capacities-first philosophy,” also known as “capacitism,” from the perspectives of epistemology and metaphysics. It focuses on mental capacities, particularly perception and cognitive abilities, as well as causal powers, response-dependent properties, and dispositions.

Special issue article publications often bring higher citations and visibility than regular papers and attract more relevant readership due to its scope. Topoi is indexed in the Web of Science under AHCI, currently in Quartile 1 and placed in the top-10 ranked Philosophy-Category journals, with a 2023 IF of 1,3 and CiteScore of 3,1.

Guest Editors:

• Luca Oliva, University of Houston, [email protected]

• C. Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum, University of Vienna, [email protected]

DESCRIPTION:

This special issue aims to analyze various models of “capacities-first philosophy,” also known as “capacitism.” It will examine the most recent and compelling arguments defending capacitism from different but complementary viewpoints in epistemology and metaphysics. We will integrate cognitive (primarily perceptual), causal, and dispositional analyses. Specifically, we intend to discuss (1) Kant’s capacitism (Longuenesse 1998; Schafer 2023) and (2) Schellenberg’s developments (2018), an account for knowledge prioritizing those cognitive conditions that are reducible to mental capacities. Within capacities-first models, we will further differentiate between cognitive abilities performing a constitutive function and related but distinct metaphysical notions. These will primarily include (3) explanatory powers, such as those clarifying causation (Thomasson 2007, 2015; Marmodoro 2010; Price 2011), and (4) response-dependent properties and dispositions (Johnston 1989, 1992, Wright 1992). Accordingly, our topic, “Capacities-First Philosophy,” will cover four key aspects, as follows.

(1) Kant’s capacitism (1787) emerges from his critique of reason as a self-subsistent organon encompassing all mental faculties required for delivering cognitions (Gomes 2017). Roughly put, he deduces the conditions for our cognitions and their objects from examining the mental capacities we inherently employ when we cognize. Our separate capacities for representation and conceptualization are central. The former enables us to have singular and immediate representations of particular objects, i.e., intuitions; the latter allows us to form abstract and general representations, known as concepts. Accordingly, Kant identifies the primary function of our cognitive capacities with the a priori synthesis of mental states (i.e., inner representations) leading to judgment, our ultimate cognitive power. Although hugely influential, his tenets have been criticized ever since (Strawson 1966; Guyer 1987, 1980).

(2) Building on Kant’s representationalism, Schellenberg (2018) develops a capacities-first view of perception. So, central to her model of capacities-first philosophy is the notion of perception. Perceptions (a) justify beliefs and yield knowledge of our environment, (b) bring about conscious mental states, and (c) convert varying informational inputs into mental representations of invariant features in our environment. Schellenberg’s fundamental insight is that perception is constituted by employing perceptual capacities whose function consists in discriminating and singling out mind-independent particulars (i.e., individual instances of a specific type) in our environment (Strawson 1959). Accordingly, she defends the particularity thesis: a subject’s perceptual state M brought about by being perceptually related to the particular α is constituted by α. Also, Schellenberg’s mental activism embraces externalism, facing criticism from reliabilists and relationalists.

(3) Being abstract functions, mental capacities lack causal powers, which, on the contrary, characterize real objects by default. Such an Eleatic criterion of existence excludes from our ontology everything that fails to make a difference to the causal powers of something – specifically, any entity falling short of causal powers (Davidson 1997). But then, how can cognitive powers relate to metaphysical powers, or how can physical states cause mental states? There is no consensus on this issue. For example, van Inwagen (2014) rejects the epiphenomenalism advocated by Kim (1993), while Williamson (2000) and Yablo (2003) question the causal relevance of mental-behavioral correlations. Yet, even if we disregard mental states, ascribing a power to a thing is challenging. Indeed, Hume’s standard definition – ‘X has the power to A, meaning X will/can do A, in the appropriate conditions, in virtue of its intrinsic nature’ (Madden and Harré 1975) – remains a subject of debate (Mumford 2009; Marmodoro 2010; Bird 2010).

(4) Nonetheless, many powers or secondary qualities of things depend on specific, usually human, capacities and arise from interaction with perceiving subjects. Therefore, our dispositions and abilities significantly influence the conceptual framework we apply to the world. Echoing Kant, response-dependence theorists such as Johnston (1989, 1992), Petit (1991), and Wright (1992) argue that much of that framework isn’t merely derived from the world around us; instead, it comes from us. Despite their differences, they subscribe to a principle of the form: x is F if and only if x would elicit response R from subjects S in circumstances C (Busck-Gundersen 2006). Dispositional and response-dependence, as well as judgment-dependence accounts indeed provide the metaphysical underpinning for the discussion about capacities in philosophy.

Possible topics include (but are not limited to):

• Kant and the theories of mental capacities

• Cognitive and/or conceptual capacities

• Capacities and perception

• Representationalism

• Schellenberg’s particularity thesis and its arguments

• Phenomenology of perceptual experience

• Powers, capacities, and causation

• Mental states and dispositions

• Response-dependence properties

• Capacities in epistemology

• Metaphysical capacities and the relationship between potency and act

• Potentiality, abilities, and capacities

• Different kinds of capacities

• Capacities-first philosophy?

Submission DEADLINE: Please submit your paper by December 15th, 2025. Should you not be able to meet this deadline, please contact the Lead Guest Editor (contact details below).

Online SUBMISSION: Please use the journal’s Online Manuscript Submission System (Editorial Manager), accessible here Editorial Manager®. Do note that paper submissions via email are not accepted.

Author Submission’s GUIDELINES: Authors are asked to prepare their manuscripts according to the journal’s standard Submission Guidelines.

EDITORIAL PROCESS:

• When uploading your paper in Editorial Manager, please select “SI: Capacities-first Philosophy” in the drop-down menu “Article Type”.

• Papers should not exceed a maximum of 9000 words.

• All papers will undergo the journal’s standard review procedure (double-blind peer-review), according to the journal’s Peer Review Policy, Process and Guidance

• Reviewers will be selected according to the Peer Reviewer Selection policies.

• This journal offers the option to publish Open Access. You are allowed to publish open access through Open Choice. Please explore the OA options available through your institution by referring to our list of OA Transformative Agreements.

• Once papers are accepted, they will be made available as Online articles publications until final publication into an issue and available on the page Collections.

CONTACT: For any questions, please contact the Guest Editors: Luca Oliva, [email protected] or Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum, [email protected]