Habitual AgencyDavid Owens (University of Reading)
March 24, 2014, 1:00pm - 2:30pm
Institute of Philosophy, University of London
Senate House
London
United Kingdom
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Mon 24 Mar
5.00pm, Room 246, second floor, Senate House, WC1 David Owens (Reading) Habitual Agency
Abstract: Many philosophers have claimed that intentional activity must be directed at some (apparent) good. Cases of habitual agency appear to contradict this claim and have therefore been held to be non-intentional. I argue that much habitual activity is intentional and so the claim must be abandoned. Habitual agency is intentional, even where there is no good in the manifestation of the habit, provided the habit manifested is itself good (i.e. is itself a virtue).
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Poster: http://philosophy.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/PracticalReasoningSpring2014.pdf
Organised by Maria Alvarez ([email protected]) and Clayton Littlejohn ([email protected]), King's College London
Admission Free. All welcome. End Announcement.
5.00pm, Room 246, second floor, Senate House, WC1 David Owens (Reading) Habitual Agency
Abstract: Many philosophers have claimed that intentional activity must be directed at some (apparent) good. Cases of habitual agency appear to contradict this claim and have therefore been held to be non-intentional. I argue that much habitual activity is intentional and so the claim must be abandoned. Habitual agency is intentional, even where there is no good in the manifestation of the habit, provided the habit manifested is itself good (i.e. is itself a virtue).
.
Poster: http://philosophy.sas.ac.uk/sites/default/files/files/PracticalReasoningSpring2014.pdf
Organised by Maria Alvarez ([email protected]) and Clayton Littlejohn ([email protected]), King's College London
Admission Free. All welcome. End Announcement.
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