Semantics of Thought Experiments

C. Peter Hertogh

SEMANTICS OF THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS       Abstract (ab. 565 words)       The research question of Semantics of Thought Experiments (TE) for a unified but nonreductionist theory of TE*—reviewing main literature as Horowitz and Massey 1991, Sorensen 1992, Gendler 1996, and updates--is answered by a provisional proposal involving four views, (i) Extended Argument View (TE Matrix, TE Diagram), (ii) Extended Logic View (incl. plausibility logic, possible worlds semantics PWS), (iii) Descriptive Semantics View and (iv) Progress of Science and Society View (incl. global cross-culturalism and environmental pragmaticism).   For the skeptics there are proposed Transformation Rules or Substitution Theses to substitute TE by experiments (TR/ST1) and nonmodal arguments (TR/ST2).   (i) The Argument View of TE is defended by extension from TE analyses (as syllogisms, hypotheticals, reductios, counterfactuals, paradoxes) to an Extended Argument View by exemplification of tacit, contextual or theoretical premises and presuppositions (axioms, theorems, derivations in MTE, regularities, laws, epistemological and scientific principles in empirical sciences).   (ii) The Extended Argument View embraces Extended Logic View including both classical logic (e.g. Wittgenstein 1961) and nonclassical logics as probability logic and possible worlds semantics (PWS). We can hold on to tertium non datur for probability logic is a cognitive apparatus (as applied as plausibility logic in TE Diagram), and PWS involves theoretical possible worlds as available and accessible constituents of theories in mathematics and empirical sciences which satisfy premises and conclusions of TE arguments unto positive truth values (T(rue)) on a bivalent logic (as applied in TE Matrix).   (iii) As the PW (e.g. Kripke 1980, 2019) of TE arguments (premises and conclusions) pick out accessible possible worlds (as from  axioms to principles) unto the argument is both formally and informally logically validated (ie logical inference is valid, premises and conclusions are true—so, argument is sound), we don't need to prescribe any forcing formal validation function. (Descriptive Semantics View).   (iv) On Progress of Science and Society View a fallible theory (as after e.g. Popper 1959, 1979, Lakatos 1976, Yablo 1993, and updates) is proposed (including error correction in the heuristic process of picking out available and accessible PW) that defines TE as cognitive mental tests designed to resolve (predefined) problems. Subtheses of global cross-culturalism and environmental pragmaticism criticize and substitute cultural, economic, moral and scientific biases of bygone era of modernism.    The semantic TE theory is successfully applied to over ten examples of TE from mathematics, philosophy of mind (consciousness studies) and philosophy of natural sciences (classical and relativity physics) with help of TE Matrix, a TE specific logical notation and procedure, involving bracketing of TE from [TE]RS, [TE]BS to [TE]EX  (resp. restricted, broad, extended TE arguments) until TE have been fully developed into valid and sound formal logical arguments.   Examples of TE (analyses) discussed in thesis and supplementary papers are, e.g., Aristotle's Surface of a Sphere, Euler's 0,9999 Equals 1; Descartes's Cogito; Putnam's Twin Earth; Kirk's and Chalmers's Zombies; Galileo's Falling Bodies; Einstein's Elevator; Martin Luther King Jr.'s I Have a Dream; Nelson Goodman's Grue; Ibn Sina's Flying Man; Siddhartha Gautama's Vipassana Meditation; Laozi's Dao De Jing; Zhuangzi's Butterfly Dream, Happiness of Fish (resp. ... 2021, 2016, 2022, 2023, 2023, 2024, 2022, 2020, 2015, 2018, 2025, 2024).                     *… a unified but nonreductionist theory … may indicate a theory that explains use of TE in many different contexts without reducing explanation to a particular context (e.g. reducing use of TE in natural sciences and humanities to use of TE in maths, or reducing iconic and indexical TE to symbolic TE).