CFP: Reimagining Social Epistemology: Methodological Reassessments and Future Prospects (Special Issue of Crítica in memory of Alvin I. Goldman)

Since the publication of Alvin Goldman’s (1999) Knowledge in a Social World, social epistemology has undergone remarkable growth and innovation, establishing itself as a dynamic and influential field of philosophical inquiry. This expansion has been driven by a wave of theoretical innovation, deepening our understanding of knowledge as it is situated within social contexts.

Over the past two decades, numerous research programs have taken social epistemology in diverse and thought-provoking directions. These include, but are not limited to: Judgement Aggregation (e.g. List & Pettit, 2002), Group Virtue Epistemology (e.g. Kallestrup, 2020), Situated Feminist Epistemology (e.g. Grasswick & Webb, 2002), 4E Cognition (e.g. Catala, et al., 2021), the Epistemology of Attention (Pinedo & Villanueva, 2022), Socially Extended Epistemology (e.g. Carter et al. 2018), Environmental Epistemology (Amico-Korby et al., 2024), Epistemic Logic (e.g. Baltag, 2018), Affective Epistemology (Berninger, 2019), the Sociology of Knowledge (e.g. Fuller, 2002), Epistemic Injustice (e.g. Origgi, 2022), Cognitive Niche Construction (e.g. Arfini et al., 2019), and Ideology Critique (e.g. Haslanger, 2021).

These approaches have introduced fresh perspectives on key questions in social epistemology, incorporating factors such as inter-agent interaction, the role of material environments, and the influence of pragmatic factors in epistemological accounts.

Given this backdrop of diversity and innovation, the time is ripe for a comprehensive reassessment of the methodologies underpinning research in social epistemology. Such a reflection will not only help consolidate the field but also open up new pathways.

In memory of Alvin Goldman and in recognition of his seminal contributions to the field, we invite submissions that engage with the following questions:

• What emerging concepts or methodologies could address gaps in current social epistemology research?
• Which theoretical notions might help unify, categorize, or establish a dialogue among the many approaches within social epistemology?
• What ontological assumptions about individuals, groups, or other social entities underpin existing theories in social epistemology?
• What are the appropriate units of evaluation when assessing knowledge within social epistemology?
• How can social epistemology be expanded to better address issues of social critique and amelioration? How might it speak more directly to underrepresented contexts, such as those specific to the Global South?

By critically engaging these and related questions, we aim to sharpen the theoretical and methodological tools of social epistemology, ensuring its continued relevance and impact—both philosophically and socially. 

Submission Guidelines

Papers should not exceed 10,000 words, excluding references, and must be submitted in PDF or Word format to the following email [email protected]. Submissions should conform to Crítica's Style Guide. Contributions may be written in English or Spanish. Authors who would like feedback on the suitability of a potential proposal are welcome to contact us in advance. The deadline for submissions is December 1st, 2026.

Authors must submit two electronic versions of their manuscripts. One should include the author's name, the title of the contribution, email address, and postal address (including phone number). A second version must be prepared for anonymous peer review, with all references to the author omitted, including acknowledgments and bibliographic details. The file containing the article must include the title, an abstract (maximum 100 words), and a list of five keywords not mentioned in the title. If possible, the title, abstract, and keywords must be provided in both Spanish and English.

Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía is a quarterly journal published by the Institute for Philosophical Research at UNAM in Mexico. For more information, please visit http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx.

References

Amico-Korby, D., Harrell, M., & Danks, D. (2024). Environmental epistemology. Synthese, 203(3), 81.

Arfini, S., Bertolotti, T., & Magnani, L. (2019). Online communities as virtual cognitive niches. Synthese, 196(1), 377-397.

Baltag, A., Boddy, R., & Smets, S. (2018). Group knowledge in interrogative epistemology. In H. van Ditmarsch & G. Sandu (Eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on knowledge and game-theoretical semantics (pp. 131–164). Springer.

Catala, A., Faucher, L., & Poirier, P. (2021). Autism, epistemic injustice, and epistemic disablement: A relational account of epistemic agency. Synthese, 199(3), 9013-9039.

Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., & Pritchard, D. (Eds.). (2018). Socially extended epistemology. Oxford University Press.

Fuller, S. (2002). Social epistemology. Indiana University Press.

Goldman, A. I. (1999). Knowledge in a social world. Oxford University Press.

Grasswick, H. E., & Webb, M. O. (2002). Feminist epistemology as social epistemology. Social epistemology, 16(3), 185-196.

Haslanger, S. (2021). Political epistemology and social critique. Oxford studies in political philosophy, 7, 23-65.

Kallestrup, J. (2020). Group virtue epistemology. Synthese, 197, 5233-5251.

List, C., & Pettit, P. (2002). Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result. Economics & Philosophy, 18(1), 89-110.

Origgi, G. (2012). Epistemic injustice and epistemic trust. Social Epistemology, 26(2), 221-235.

Pinedo, M. & Villanueva, N. (2022). Epistemic de-platforming. In D. B. Plou, V. F. Castro & J. R. Torices, eds., The Political Turn in Analytic Philosophy: Reflections on Social Injustice and Oppression. De Gruyter, pp. 105–134.