CFP: American Philosophical Quarterly (SI: Values in Science)
Submission deadline: February 15, 2026
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Call For Papers: There Is No Such Thing as Science
American Philosophical Quarterly (Special Issue)
Guest Editors:
Bennett Holman (Yonsei University)
&
Torsten Wilholt (University of Hannover)
In the philosophy of science, efforts to move beyond the value-free ideal have been underway for decades, and the “New Demarcation Problem” may have played a role in intensifying the debate about suitable replacements. And yet, not all of the recent developments are pulling in the same direction. For example, there has been significant development in the philosophical accounts of political legitimacy and the importance of publicly endorsed values. But at the same time there have been persuasive arguments provided in favor of the need for partisan science. Similarly, while new arguments have been offered in favor of avoiding an incorporation of values where possible, there are also compelling arguments that in many cases this will not be desirable. And so on.
In our focus paper of this special issue, we will revisit the task of determining where and how the line between epistemic distortion and management of epistemic risk (what we have called the New Demarcation Problem) is to be drawn. We now argue that either there is no single line to be drawn or, if there is, the most productive step forward for the current debate would be to step away from attempting to produce a single replacement for the value-free ideal. But our call for a plurality of ideals is not unconstrained. In the focus piece of the special issue we argue that the appropriate ideal depends on the “job” envisioned for science in some particular context. We illustrate the potential of this account by returning to the case study from the New Demarcation Problem. Here we show how considering the job science was tasked with in the Upper Klamath Lakes case study resolves the dispute between the Fish and Wildlife Services and National Research Council.
Our goal for the special issue is to invite philosophers to explore how, and at what level, we can meaningfully articulate coherent jobs for science. We believe a finer-grained consideration of what jobs we want science to do can help us develop accounts of what science must be like in order to be so employed. Accordingly, for the special issue, we are primarily interested in soliciting a variety of fine-grained analyses that articulates some job for science and what replacement ideal is superior to value-freedom for that job (or why for some job, the value-free ideal should be retained).
Here are some examples of “jobs” for science that may fruitfully be distinguished from one another:
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To advance knowledge through curiosity-driven inquiry
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To inform and support regulatory decision-making
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To generate knowledge essential for technological innovation
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To pursue knowledge collaboratively with local communities
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To produce knowledge that addresses epistemic injustices and meets the needs of particular groups
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To provide guidance and expertise for policy deliberation
These are just examples -- we are open to other “jobs” or a completely different way of categorization. We would also welcome a critique of this philosophical project.
Submission deadline (hard) February, 15th 2026:
Interested parties should submit a 500 word abstract. Six submissions will be invited to contribute a paper to a special issue of American Philosophical Quarterly.
Please direct any questions, abstract submissions, or requests for a draft of the focus article to:
Bennett Holman ([email protected])