Saving the Realist Stance

Mr Cristian Soto (University of Melbourne)

In this paper I articulate and defend the realist stance on the interpretation of science. To begin with, I outline the realist stance as the non-empirical claim that recommends taking science at first value. The realist stance is grounded in the fact that science has actually proved to be successful in uncovering objective features of reality. Three are the main claims I want to put forward: first,  as a non-empirical claim, the realist stance is restricted to promote in this case a realist attitude towards the interpretation of science rather than an empirical claim about the current state of scientific research; second, a priori philosophical speculation cannot settle the question of what parts of our current best scientific theories will be conserved in possible future cases of scientific theory change; and third, any feasible philosophical strategy that wants to recommend a suitable form of realism about science is to be developed as a case by case analysis of particular scientific theories rather than as a conception of science in general. The moral therefore is as follows: the less the philosophical speculation, the better for the articulation and defence of the realist stance on the interpretation of science. In other words, the realist stance can best be articulated and defended only if it is thoroughly informed by actual scientific practice in those areas of scientific research regarding which realism is worth being recommended.