Aristotle on Bad Arguments

Why does Aristotle include knowledge of defective arguments within the arts of dialectic and rhetoric? On one attractive way of understanding the nature of Aristotelian rhetoric and dialectic, these are (in large measure) expertises in the use of good arguments and good reasoning to persuade others. How then should we explain the place Aristotle gives to defective arguments (merely apparent enthymemes / syllogisms / refutations, sophisms, and in general invalid and otherwise defective arguments) within his works on these expertises of dialectic and rhetoric (Topics, Sophistical Refutations and Rhetoric)? How should we understand his apparent recommendations regarding the use of such arguments? By what standards of propriety does he mark out arguments as “merely apparent syllogisms/enthymemes”, particularly given his famously “more relaxed” standards for genuine enthymemes in rhetoric?

Questions of this kind are the subject of a workshop within the Leading Minds research project at the University of Leeds. The workshop runs from 4th-5th July (2pm-2pm) at the Inter-Disciplinary Ethics Applied Centre, University of Leeds.

Speakers:
Prof. Christof Rapp (LMU, Munich)
Dr. Jakob Fink (University of Copenhagen)
Dr. Valentina Di Lascio (University of Durham and Centre for Hellenic Studies, Harvard)
Dr. Jamie Dow (University of Leeds).

Further updates and booking details will shortly be available here: