CFP: Phenomenologies of Unique Value (Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology)

Duquesne Studies in Phenomenology
Special Issue: Phenomenologies of Unique Value

Editor-in-Chief:
Dr. Jeffrey McCurry (Duquesne University, Director of the Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center)

Issue Editors:
Dr. Eric J. Mohr (Saint Vincent College)
Dr. Sarah Borden Sharkey (Wheaton College)

If it is the case that each individual person is unique, then a related question is whether individuality implies a unique value of individuals. Does every individual has some distinctive value in their own right? And if so, what sort of value is it, what is its source, and what is its evidence? The idea relates to both historical and contemporary philosophical contexts related to personal identity, philosophical anthropology, personalism, value theory, and ethical (and meta-ethical) considerations. 

We invite scholars to submit abstracts taking a phenomenological approach to the question of the unique value that persons potentially possess as individuals and areas related to this question, both supporting and critical perspectives. 

Historically, Kant claimed that what it means that persons possess dignity is to possess irreplaceable value or incomparable worth that “does not admit of an equivalent.” Later, Scheler challenges Kantian “personalism” as failing to account for personal individuality and the “individual value-essence.” Scheler’s work was influential for twentieth-century personalism generally, including the work of Edith Stein, Emmanuel Mounier, Jose Ortega y Gasset, and Karol Wojtyla (John Paul II). 

While the personalist tradition in phenomenology is a key area, we are interested in submissions drawing from the whole phenomenological tradition broadly, and treatments that offer phenomenological engagement with non-phenomenological thinkers. 

Some contemporary philosophers, outside of the phenomenological tradition, have taken up this theme in different ways. Certain analytic value theorists have given attention to the notion of “irreplaceable value” as a type of “intrinsic value” (e.g. G. Bradford, C. Gowans, A Kadlac, E. H. Matthes, etc.). Others consider connections between unique value and love (e.g., C. Grau, A. Iacona, N. Kolodny, N. Kreft, J. D. Velleman, etc.), for example, with respect to the idea of “attachment” and its relation to value (e.g., J. Raz). Linda Zagzebski has written exploratory pieces on the “value of uniqueness” in relation to dignity. And Rebecca Newberger Goldstein has a book (2026) on the adjacent idea of “mattering.” Contributors are welcome to engage with aspects of this scholarship in relation to phenomenology. 

The deadline for abstract submission is April 19, 2026

Submission Guidelines:

• Submit only abstracts at this time.
• Abstracts should be approximately 300 words.
• Final papers should be approximately 6000-8000 words.
• Citations should adhere to the Chicago Manual of Style.
• Send submissions to both [email protected] and [email protected].

Important Dates:

• Abstracts are due by April 19, 2026.
• Decisions on abstracts will be made by May 1, 2026.
• Full submissions are due by February 1, 2027.