Brickhouse and Smith on the Unity of VirtueGeorge Rudebusch (Northern Arizona University)
part of:
Socrates: A Conference in Honor of Nicholas D. Smith
Friday: Albany 218; Friday Reception: Armstrong Lounge, Manor House; Saturday and Sunday: J.R. Howard Hall 202
615 SW Palatine Hill Road
Portland 97219-7899
United States
Organisers:
Details
In the Protagoras, Socrates argues that all of the virtues consist in a single power: knowledge of human well-being. On this account the specific virtues must all be one and the same thing. But in the Laches and Meno, Socrates seemingly endorses and certainly encourages others to endorse that specific virtues are distinct parts of a single whole. This has been a problem for those seeking a coherent account of Socrates’ philosophy. In Socratic Moral Psychology, Brickhouse and Smith propose to solve the problem by finding a coherent account. Their solution rests on two distinctions. First is a distinction between a single power (dunamis) and its many products (erga). Second is a distinction between theoretical and applied expertise. I argue that neither distinction can help support their solution.
Registration
No
Who is attending?
No one has said they will attend yet.
Will you attend this event?