From Relative Truth to Finean Non-Factualism
Alex Jackson (Boise State University)

July 1, 2014, 1:00pm - 2:00pm
Institute of Philosophy, University of London

London
United Kingdom

Topic areas

Details

Tues 1 July, 5.00pm
Room 233, second floor, Senate House, WC1

Alex Jackson (Boise State University)

From Relative Truth to Finean Non-Factualism

Abstract: This paper compares two 'relativist' theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine's non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis - its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non-factualism is the better relativist theory.
.

Summer 2014 Series:

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)

Reminders

Registration

No

Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?


Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.