Disinformation and Choice

Clayton Littlejohn (Australian Catholic University)

Philosophers working on disinformation seem to agree that it should be understood in epistemic terms (e.g., as a tool for inducing false belief, as a device for increasing confidence in falsehoods, etc.). In congressional reports, the US State Department endorses a similar definition but also says that disinformation is any (non-propagandistic) content that can be used to gain a strategic advantage. What's the relationship between disinformation seen as a tool for manipulating belief and disinformation as a tool for influencing choice? I shall argue that there isn't one. When agents have interests that aren't aligned, one might try to gain strategic advantage over the other using deception, but it is naive to think that this is their only rational play. A disinformant can change the available information in ways that will be strategically advantageous without inducing any discernible epistemic harm upon their adversaries. I shall argue that we should understand disinformation in pragmatic terms and show that this approach lets us identify harmful uses of content that pose significant threats to democracies and to individuals that prevailing epistemic approaches miss. Rather than think of it as a tool for manipulation via the implantation of false belief, we should think of it as a tool for optimising choice to suit the disinformant's ends in ways the disinformant can see degrades the value of the information for the audience's pursuit of their ends.