CFP: Synthese Topical Collection: “Emotional Recalcitrance: Descriptive and Normative Analyses”

Call for Papers for a Synthese Topical Collection

Title: Emotional Recalcitrance: Descriptive and Normative Analyses

Guest Editors: Giulio Sacco (Polytechnic University of Turin), Alessandra Fussi (University of Pisa), Ed Armitage (Aarhus University)

Topical Collection Description:

Sometimes, our emotions seem to conflict with our reasoned judgments. One may be afraid of flying without believing that flying is dangerous; or one may love someone without believing that they possess the qualities that make them lovable. This phenomenon, known as emotional recalcitrance (D’Arms & Jacobson 2003), has become one of the most debated topics in the recent philosophy of emotion.

Historically, cases of emotional recalcitrance have been used as an objection to judgmental theories of emotion, challenging their view of emotions as evaluative judgments (Greenspan 1988; Majeed 2022). This is because such theories seem committed to the conclusion that recalcitrant emotions amount to a contradiction within one’s beliefs, thereby ascribing an implausible level of irrationality to ordinary agents. Yet anti-judgmental theories face no fewer difficulties (Helm 2001; Sacco 2024). Whether emotions are described as perceptual illusions (Roberts 2003; Tappolet 2012; Döring 2014) or as conflicts between judgments and feelings (Goldie 2000), such accounts fail to explain the sense of rational friction that these cases generate. Having an optical illusion is not irrational in itself; conversely, if I am afraid of a dog I reflectively judge to be harmless, I seem to fall into some kind of rational failure.

Faced with this problem, a wide range of solutions has been proposed to account for the ostensible irrationality of recalcitrant emotions without positing as much irrationality as a direct contradiction between beliefs. Some argue that they involve milder forms of epistemic or practical irrationality than such contradiction (Brady 2007); others that they motivate an irrational form of practical reasoning (Armitage 2025). Still others maintain that their irrationality lies in the fact that the partial reason on which they are based is outweighed by an all-things-considered judgment (Benbaji 2013), or that the pairing of emotion and judgment is such that, if one attitude is satisfied, the other cannot logically be (Grzankowski 2020). There are also those who challenge the very idea that our web of beliefs is uniform and coherent (Goffin 2022; Pendoley 2023; Sacco 2025), while some reject the view that there is anything inherently irrational about recalcitrant emotions at all (Döring 2015; Thomason 2022).

This Special Issue aims to deepen the study of emotional recalcitrance by complementing the classic debates with new and broader perspectives. While questions concerning the rationality of recalcitrant emotions remain of central interest, the issue also seeks to expand our understanding of them in other domains. Thus far, for example, most analyses have focused on a small subset of emotions—primarily fear and, to a lesser extent, anger. Are all emotions equally prone to recalcitrance, or are some (such as awe, admiration, gratitude, relief, boredom, or other mild affective states) less resistant? If different emotions vary in their degree of recalcitrance, what might this reveal about their nature? Furthermore, what is the relationship between recalcitrant emotions and central phenomena in psychotherapeutic practice, such as phobias? Do they share the same normative status, or do they differ in their degree of irrationality? Can phenomenological or situated approaches to affectivity help us better understand recalcitrant emotions? Should we really consider them irrational, or is it possible to reframe recalcitrance in a way that avoids any attribution of irrationality?

The Special Issue will bring together contributions that examine emotional recalcitrance from both descriptive and normative perspectives. Possible topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following:

• Are all emotions equally prone to recalcitrance, or do some display different degrees of resistance? Could there be a class of emotions that are less, or more, likely to be recalcitrant than those usually examined, and what might this reveal about their nature?
• What is the relationship between recalcitrant emotions and other psychological phenomena, such as phobias? What analogies and disanalogies can be drawn, and how might empirical research contribute to a (thus far) predominantly philosophical debate?
• Can recent theories of emotion, or less commonly applied frameworks such as phenomenology or situated affectivity, help address the problem of emotional recalcitrance?
• How does emotional recalcitrance relate to the notion of fittingness?
• What is the epistemic status and practical (dis)value of recalcitrant emotions? Should they always be considered irrational?
• What underlies the pervasive assumption that recalcitrant emotions are epistemically unsound? Why not assume that they track truth better than beliefs?
• What are the implications of emotional recalcitrance for theories of rationality, moral psychology, and the philosophy of mind?
• How, if at all, is emotional recalcitrance related to ‘akrasia’ or ‘weakness of will’?
• What can recalcitrant emotions tell us about self-knowledge?
• Can we distinguish different “kinds” of emotional recalcitrance, corresponding to different components of emotion?
• What explains the occurrence of recalcitrant emotions?

For further information, please contact the leading guest editor: [email protected]

The deadline for submissions is: 15 January 2027

Submissions via:https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt/default.aspx