The analytic-phenomenological reading of Wittgenstein

Aaron Harrison (La Trobe University)

'There is a way of reading of Wittgenstein which I call the analytic-phenomenological reading (exemplfied in: M B Hintikka & J Hintikka, 1985, 1986; Hintikka 1996; Park 1998a, 1998b). Very broadly, this reading claims that: i) throughout his career, Wittgenstein is best thought of as a kind of phenomenologist; and ii) this phenomenology is the product of inheriting certain ideas from the physicists Mach, Boltzmann, and Hertz, through the prism of Russell and Moore. Although much discussed, there are few commentaries that do justice to the subtleties of this reading. This may be because its subtleties occasionally border on equivocations. I will examine this reading, paying particular attention to the fate of 'phenomenological objects', and the implications for Wittgenstein's remarks on 'seeing as'. I argue that Wittgenstein's later use of the word 'Aspekt' causes problems for the analytic-phenomenological reading'.