The role of models in scientific thinking

Mr Cristian Soto

In this paper, I investigate the role of models in scientific thinking. I take this role to be characterised by the epistemic contribution of models to science. Models, I claim, are epistemic tools that facilitate the epistemic success of scientific practice. I briefly compare the role and nature of models in order to defend the view that their role matters more than their nature when it comes to understanding their contribution to science. Regardless of the nature of models, what truly grants them their place in science is their role as epistemic tools and their epistemic contribution to scientific practice. I examine in further detail such epistemic contribution, looking into some paradigmatic scientific tasks that are based on models. I pay particular attention to model-based scientific representation, model-based scientific explanation, and several approaches to model-based scientific creativity in discovery, prediction and heuristics. Considering these analyses, I put forward  the claim that the examination of the epistemic contribution of models to science allows philosophers to elaborate a closer and more realistic view of science as practised, promoting minimalist views regarding the epistemic scope of science. I close by summarising the main remarks as to the role of models in scientific thinking.