Nietzsche on Perspectivism

Christopher Fowles

Abstract

That Nietzsche refers to something called perspectivism is well known. Literature on his work has concerned itself with perspectivism for as long as there has been such a literature. Despite this sustained scholarly attention, consensus as to what exactly Nietzsche means by the term has proven stubbornly elusive, with there being nearly as many readings as there are readers. This reflects a number of factors, the most inauspicious of which is that Nietzsche’s own remarks suggest rather different views and seem to pull us in contrary directions. Here, I propose a way of construing his various claims that renders them consistent and complementary. Work to date, I’ll argue, has tended towards a single, quite fundamental error, viz. the widespread assumption that the term ‘perspectivism’ denotes a doctrine whose content is presented across the canonical perspectivism passages. Instead, I’ll argue that perspectivism is a property. Thinking of perspectivism in these terms, I hope to demonstrate, not only offers an account of what perspectivism is but also suggests an explanation of why Nietzsche employs it (and related concepts) in the passages that he does, and in connection to the various topics on which it is brought to bear.