Pierre Duhem’s Solution to Theory Choice

Milena Ivanova

Abstract:   In this paper I examine Duhem’s concept of good sense as an attempt to support a non rule-governed account of rationality in theory choice. Faced with the underdetermination of theory by evidence thesis and the continuity thesis, Duhem accounts for the ability of scientists to choose theories that continuously grow to a natural classification by employing their ‘good sense’. I examine the concept of good sense and provide a list of its properties. Then I turn my attention to a recent debate concerning the interpretation of good sense due to David Stump and Abrol Fairweather who argue that good sense can be understood as a virtue epistemological concept. I argue that even though this approach can be useful for the better comprehension of the concept of good sense, there are some substantial differences between virtue epistemologists and Duhem. In the light of this reconstruction of good sense, I propose a new way of interpreting the concept of good sense that overcomes the noted difficulties.