Feyerabend Reads Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. A Closer Look At Feyerabend's Criticism

Ulrich Arnswald (University of Innsbruck, University of Innsbruck)

2022 marked the 100th anniversary of Thomas Samuel Kuhn's birth and 2024 marks the 100th anniversary of Paul Karl Feyerabend's birth. Timewise it is a good opportunity to take a closer look at Feyerabend's harsh criticism of Kuhn with a more than appropriate time lag, especially since Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions is undoubtedly still the dominant theory of science in the social sciences today across all subjects. Thus, this criticism is also still current and relevant.   Kuhn's theory of science is very ambiguous in the sense that it does not give the reader a straightforward answer as to whether or not it is intended as a methodological prescription or a description of science. A methodological prescription would tell the scientist how to proceed to fit the term 'scientific' and would automatically express Kuhn's own opinion, whereas a description of what is generally called 'scientific' would have to exclude any personal evaluation of Kuhn. Kuhn's writings allow for both interpretations.   This Kuhnian ambiguity is not at all a side issue, but is at the heart of the problem of Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It has had a great impact on those in the scientific community who have understood it as a methodological prescription; they have utilised the theory as a recipe, enabling them not only to improve their studies, but finally, to turn their fields into a 'science'. Referring to the Structure of Scientific Revolutions Feyerabend writes about Kuhn: "I was quite unable to agree with the theory of science which he himself proposed", and "was even less prepared to accept the general ideology which I thought formed the background of his thinking."(Feyerabend, Against Method, (3rd ed.) 1993: 197). As if this were not enough, Feyerabend adds, "this ideology, so it seemed to me, could only give comfort to the most narrowminded and the most conceited kind of specialism. It would tend to inhibit the advancement of knowledge. And it is bound to increase the anti-humanitarian tendencies which are such a disquieting feature of much of post-Newtonian science." (ibid., 197f.) Such a devastating critique needs further investigation. The paper will examine the main arguments of Feyerabend's attack on Kuhn's scientific thinking.