Self-Effacement, Moral Reasons, and Practical Deliberation

May 4, 2027 - May 6, 2027
University of St. Andrews

St Andrews, 5 The Scores
Saint Andrews KY16 9AL
United Kingdom

This will be an accessible event, including organized related activities

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This event is available both online and in-person

Sponsor(s):

  • Scots Philosophical Association
  • Aristotelian Society
  • Department of Philosophy, University of St Andrews

Speakers:

Open University (UK)
University of Texas at Austin
University of Zürich
University of St. Andrews
University of Groningen
University of Sheffield

Organisers:

University of St. Andrews

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The aim of this workshop is to bring together researchers in normative ethics and metaethics who work on topics related to moral self-effacement. After its introduction to analytic philosophy by Sidgwick (1874) and Parfit (1984), self-effacement remained understudied outside of the narrow field of consequentialist ethics. However, in recent years, it has begun to receive increasing attention in the philosophical literature.

On the one hand, there is an ongoing, unresolved debate about which kinds of theories are self-effacing, which spans different ethical traditions - from virtue ethics (Woodcock, 2020; Pettigrove, 2011) to new developments in consequentialism (Venkatesh, 2021). On the other, researchers have been noticing the connection between self-effacement and high-level metaethical categories such as expressivism and realism (Streumer, 2026). Finally, some have questioned whether self-effacement is a flaw of a theory (Woodcock, 2022), as it has been customary to see it (Stocker, 1976). 

Furthermore, self-effacement bears important yet understudied connections to central topics in moral philosophy: the problem of moral alienation in intimate relationships (Railton, 1984), indirect or two-level moral theories (Hare, 1981), and the publicity condition (Eggleston, 2013). Last but not least, it is also receiving increasing attention outside of moral philosophy (Nguyen, 2020). 

At the same time, if our moral theories are indeed self-effacing, we need to seriously reconsider multiple common assumptions about morality. We need to ask questions about the nature and structure of moral deliberation anew. This workshop aims to address these questions, situating self-effacement within the debates on moral reasons and practical deliberation. 

Confirmed speakers:

  • Julia Driver (UT Austin)

  • Bart Streumer (University of Groeningen) 

  • Sophie Grace Chappell (Open University)  

  • Nikhil Venkatesh (University of Sheffield) 

  • Agata Łukomska (University of Warsaw) 

  • Stefan Fischer (University of Zurich/University of Konstanz)

  • Max McLoughlin (Uppsala University)

  • Ida Miczke (University of St Andrews)

The workshop will be streamed online on Microsoft Teams, but all speakers are required to present in person.

We aim to make the conference accessible and follow the BPA/SWIP guidelines for accessible conferences. The conference is organised in an accessible venue and we encourage participants to get in contact with the organising team if there are any specific accessibility issues on which they might require support. We do not have any accessibility funds at the moment, but we are very happy to help in applying for additional accessibility funding, as well as to arrange additional accessibility options. There is also an opportunity to apply for additional funding to offset costs of dependent care, and we encourage participants to inform us about their needs in this respect. 

The workshop is generously supported by the Scots Philosophical Association, Aristotelian Society, and the Department of Philosophy at the University of St Andrews.

Organiser: Ida Miczke ([email protected])

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April 30, 2027, 7:00am BST

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