The Factive Turn in Epistemology

THE FACTIVE TURN IN EPISTEMOLOGY
Workshop
7-8 May 2015
Vienna University

INVITED SPEAKERS
Maria Alvarez (KCL)
Clayton Littlejohn (KCL)
Aidan McGlynn (Edinburgh)
Timothy Williamson (Oxford)

Good reasons for belief used to be one a penny. Even brains in vats had
them. But recently epistemologists have become pickier, and are
beginning to think that only facts, true propositions, or factive mental
states can be good reasons for belief. This Factive Turn has been
variously motivated by considerations from philosophy of mind (e.g.,
Williamson), practical reason (e.g., Littlejohn), metaethics (e.g.,
Alvarez, Dancy), and philosophy of perception (e.g., Pritchard).
Naturally, the Turn - like any other flourishing research programme -
has attracted plenty of critical attention (e.g., McGlynn). This
workshop aims at bringing together philosophers working on the factivity
of epistemic reasons. Topics include:

1.Are good epistemic reasons facts or mental states?

2.If reasons are mental states, do only factive types count as good
reasons?

3.If reasons are factive and psychological, do we need to insist on
factive mental state types? Won’t veridical tokens of non-factive states
– e.g., true beliefs – do just as well?

4.Would the factivity of epistemic reasons commit us to metaphysical
disjunctivism?

5.Are good reasons and the believer’s reasons of different ontological
kinds?

ORGANIZERS
Unit for Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Institute for
Philosophy, Vienna University

WORKSHOP WEBSITE