Revisionary Intellectualism and Gettier

Dr Yuri Cath (La Trobe University)

How should intellectualists respond to apparent Gettier-style counterexamples? Stanley (Know how, 2011a, Ch. 8) offers an orthodox response which rejects the claim that the subjects in such scenarios possess knowledge-how. I argue that intellectualists should embrace a revisionary response according to which knowledge-how is a distinctively practical species of knowledge-that that is compatible with Gettier-style luck.

Yuri Cath's research is concerned with foundational questions in epistemology about the nature and sources of different kinds of knowledge, and the import of these issues for debates in the philosophy of mind, moral epistemology, and metaphilosophy. Before joining La Trobe he was Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia (2012-2014) and an AHRC Research Fellow at the University of St Andrews (2008-2012). He completed his PhD at The Australian National University under the supervision of Daniel Stoljar and David Chalmers, and his MA at the University of Auckland. He has also completed a BFA (also at Auckland) with a major in painting, after which he worked in the Auckland Art Gallery before leaving the arts for the more practical field of philosophy.