The Inconsistency of the Doctrine of the Trinity with That of Monotheism. The Straighforward Demonstration.
Richard Hennessey (Merrimack College (Retired))

part of: The Metaphysics of the Trinity: New Directions
March 14, 2016, 1:00am - 1:30am
Metaphysics of Entanglement project, University of Oxford

Corpus Christi College
Oxford
United Kingdom

Go to conference's page

Sponsor(s):

  • Aristotelian Society
  • Templeton World Charity Foundation

Organisers:

Daniel Kodaj
Oxford University
Anna Marmodoro
Oxford University
University of Birmingham

Topic areas

Details

In the proposed paper I will present the straightforward demonstration, using the logic of identity and in the strictest sense of demonstration, of the inconsistency of the doctrine of monotheism with the doctrine of the real plurality of divine persons. I offer the proof in two versions. The first version sets it forth in what is almost ordinary English, albeit an English “regimented” in such a way as to remove the ambiguity of really ordinary English and to make every inferential step obvious, even painfully obvious. The second version, pretty much as fully formalized as the application of the formal logic of identity to the doctrines at hand can be, will be offered in the forma of a handout, as its oral presentation would pretty much unlistenable.

An earlier version of the paper can be seen as in my post of April 4, 2014, “The Inconsistency of the Doctrine of (the Distinction of Divine Persons and so That of ) the Trinity with Monotheism,”on my blog, After Aristotle, at http://afteraristotle.net/2014/04/04/the-inconsistency-of-the-doctrine-of-the-distinction-of-divine-persons-and-so-that-of-the-trinity-with-monotheism/.

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)

Reminders

Registration

No

Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?


Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.