Some remarks on the phenomenology of the attentive consciousnesses

Erol Copelj

Understanding the phenomenological structure of attention is crucial for a number of questions that I address in my Ph.D. To give an example, in the methodological chapter, I raise the question: what are the similarities and differences between Buddhist meditation and the phenomenological reduction(s)? Is one practice superior to the other? There, I try to show that the phenomenological method would be a much more powerful tool if it could incorporate the concentration or mindfulness (samadhi) aspect of the Buddhist practice. In order to nurture insight (vipaasna) and discriminate phenomena, it is necessary to sturdy the mind, to make it calm and tranquil. For this, it is necessary to nurture concentration or mindfulness. But what is concentration if not a a modality of attention? This brings up the question that I will (partially) address in this talk: what is attention? I begin by arguing that ‘attention’ is an ambiguous term. On the ground of Sartre’s general distinction between consciousness, states and qualities, I argue for a three-fold distinction between attention as a consciousness, a state and a quality or potentiality. In this talk, the focus will be on the first: the attentive consciousnesses. I will try to show that the attentive consciousnesses is an intrinsic modification of the operative consciousnesses on which it is founded. To do that, I will contrast the attentive modification with a kind of extrinsic modification: the feeling modification. Having established the sense in which the attentive consciousnesses is an intrinsic modification, I will then elucidate some of the noetic and noematic changes that the operative consciousnesses undergoes in virtue of being so modified.