A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic RationalityMatthew Kopec (Charles Sturt University)
E561, Level 5, Menzies Building
Monash University
Clayton 3800
Australia
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A Pluralistic Account of Epistemic Rationality
In this essay, I aim to motivate and defend a pluralistic view of epistemic rationality. At the core of the view is the notion that epistemic rationality is essentially a species of practical rationality put in the service of various epistemic goals. First, I sketch some closely related views that have appeared in the literature. Second, I present my preferred version of the view and sketch some of its benefits. Third, I defend the view against some prominent objections offered by Thomas Kelly and Selim Berker against related views . Last, I raise some distinct worries that might linger and sketch some possible ways one might address them.
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