On Lying

In his Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant formulates his notion of the categorical imperative, of which one application contends that lying is always wrong. Essentially, he argues, one should not lie as that would be inconsistent.

Is consistency a sufficient reason to never lie? Or are there exceptional circumstances when consistency, as well as the more traditional formulations of morality, should take second place? Are there ever, in fact, any circumstances in which, if one does not lie, one is in fact being immoral?

Consideration of these and other notions on the subject of lying are welcomed from interested individuals, with submissions accepted in both Italian and English (cf. net address below). It is kindly requested that submissions in Italian be accompanied by an English translation, if possible.

Keynote speakers:

Jane Forsey (Prof. of Philosophy, University of Winnipeg): “The Truth about Lying”

Else Mogensen (Dr. Phil. of Classics, Wassard Elea): “The Praise of Pseudos”

Venanzio Raspa (Prof. Filosofia Teoretica, Dipartimento di Scienze dell’Uomo, Università degli Studi di Urbino “Carlo Bo”): “The Reality of Lies

et al.

The Parmenideum extends a welcome to all, and further extends best wishes to Eleatica for a successful and fruitful encounter in 2012.

Contact [email protected] or call +39 0974 978 005