Law as an Artifact Kind

Jonathan Crowe

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Abstract:
It is commonly stated that law is an artifact, but this claim is rarely explicitly defended. This article submits it to closer examination. I begin by asking whether law truly is an artifact, as that term is understood in the philosophical literature. I argue that law is not straightforwardly covered by the most common definition of an artifact, since not all laws have authors. However, it is possible to extend the definition to include it. This extended definition also has the virtue of accommodating other unintentionally created artifacts that fall outside the standard account. I then develop an analysis of law as an artifact kind. I contend that law is best regarded as a special type of artifact, which I call an institutional artifact. On this view, something counts as law only if, roughly, it is collectively recognised as law and meets the success conditions for being law. The latter requirement entails that the putative law must be constitutively capable of fulfilling law’s function as an artifact. I argue that law’s function as an artifact is to guide action. A putative law that is not backed by sufficient reasons to enable it to guide action therefore fails as law.