The Collective Grounds of Relations
Raul Saucedo (University of Colorado, Boulder)

September 16, 2016, 11:30am - 1:30pm
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

32-D461
32 Vassar Street
Cambridge
United States

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A central common theme across the history of metaphysics is a broadly reductionist view about relations, according to which all relational facts are grounded in non-relational facts about the relata. The view has had different incarnations over the past two and a half millennia and it is in fact a cornerstone of some of the most influential metaphysical systems in history, from Plato's purely monadic theory of forms to Aristotle's substance-accident ontology, from the scholastics' doctrine that every attribute inheres in only one subject to Leibniz's interactionless monadism, from Spinoza's, Hegel's, and Bradley's monisms to idealistic threads in American pragmatism. The view fell into disrepute in the early 20th century, with Moore and Russell's assault on the so-called doctrine of internal relations. Their objections were thought to have been decisive against not only the specific implementations of the reductionist thesis at which they were explicitly targeted (Leibniz's and Bradley's) but also the reductionist program itself. For the most part since ungrounded relationality has not been seen as especially problematic; in fact, it's taken to be unavoidable. To this date the reductionist thesis is widely regarded as a non-starter, as a curiosity belonging to the museum of obsolete metaphysical extravagances. 

My aim in this paper is to show otherwise. I articulate and defend a new version of the reductionist thesis, on which all relational phenomena are grounded in collective phenomena. I begin by motivating the reductionist program with a general argument against ungrounded relational phenomena. I then distinguish between three flavors of reductionism: a broadly Leibnizian one, according to which all relational facts are grounded in non-relational facts about the relata taken individually; a broadly Bradleyan one, according to which all relational facts are grounded in non-­relational facts about a composite entity having each relatum as a part; and (3) the one I favor, according to which all relational facts are grounded in non­-relational facts about the relata taken collectively. After making a few important clarifications about the key idea behind my proposal---the idea of non-relational collectivity, of non-relational togetherness---I argue that my form of reductionism is preferable over Leibnizian and Bradleyan varieties. First, I show that Moore's and Russell's objections are effective only against the Leibnizian version, leaving the Bradleyan and my version unscathed. I then offer a new argument against both the Leibnizian and Bradleyan versions, and show that my version is immune to it. I then respond to important objections deriving from work by Kit Fine and Tim Williamson. I close with a few general remarks about the debate over internal and external relations and with an upshot for structuralist views in the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of mathematics.

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