Deflationary Normative Naturalism

Laura Schroeter (University of Melbourne)

Abstract

According to their non-naturalist critics, normative naturalists cannot vindicate two core requirements on an adequate account of the normative domain: 1. Non-reductionism (NR): The properties picked out by normative terms are sui generis and cannot be reduced to any of the properties encountered in a naturalistic framework. 2. Objectivity (O): “Normative truths are perfectly objective, universal, absolute” (Enoch). We explain how a deflationary form of naturalism, which does not require any finite explanatory definition of properties in the normative domain in terms of properties in a more basic domain, can accommodate (NR). We highlight the metasemantic commitments incurred by any proponent of (O). We then propose a metasemantic principle which is independently plausible, germane to our deflationary naturalism, and capable of vindicating (O) under certain conditions.