Catherine Stinson: The Body in ‘Mental Illness’

Catherine Stinson (Rotman Institute of Philosophy)

Abstract: If mental and physical are separate domains, “mental illness” should not involve the body. But bodily symptoms are common among people diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. Examples are altered perceptions of hot and cold, and hallucinations of touch. Overlooking the body may contribute to the stigma of psychiatric diagnosis.

Speaker Profile: Catherine Stinson is a philosopher of science with interests in neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, and computational science. Her main interest is how scientific explanations work: How can we be sure that experimental models behave the same way as the systems they stand in for? Are computational models more like experiments run on a digital model, or like a series of calculations? How can we relate the personal, cognitive, neural, and molecular level explanations of a complex psychiatric disorder? One project Catherine is working on at the Rotman Institute is coming up with an account of what sort of a thing an explanation is that can make sense of the diverse and overlapping explanations (at multiple levels, coming from various types of models) that we use to understand a given scientific phenomenon.

This is the first lecture in a four-part series held at the Landon Branch Public Library, co-sponsored by the Rotman Institute of Philosophy, The Department of Philosophy at Western University, and the London Public Library. For details on the other library talks, please see: http://www.rotman.uwo.ca/events/the-brain-boom/