Fine Workshop

On December 19, there will be a one day workshop focused on logic and metaphysics, especially as related to the work of Kit Fine. The speakers will be Kit Fine (NYU), Rohan French, Dan Marshall (Lingnan), and Sam Cumming (UCLA).  

11-12:15 -- Dan Marshall (Lingnan) Nominalism and Ideological Parsimony

12:15-1:30 -- Rohan French Partial Content from a Proof Theoretic Point of View

1:30-2:30 -- Lunch 

2:30-3:45 -- Sam Cumming (UCLA) Vague Meaning and Rational Classification 

3:45-5:30 -- Kit Fine (NYU) Vagueness: Some Epistemological Considerations 

Marshall -- Nominalism and Ideological Parsimony

Abstract: Nominalists hold that there are no abstract objects, such as properties, sets or numbers. Realists about abstract objects, on the other hand, hold that there are abstract objects. It is widely thought that, while nominalism has the theoretical virtue of being more ontologically parsimonious than realism, it has the theoretical vice of being less ideological parsimonious than realism, since nominalists must regard as primitive many notions realists can reductively analyse. This paper argues that this is not the case.

French -- Partial Content from a Proof Theoretic Point of View

Abstract: In this talk I'll look at two different proof systems for what is plausibly the best account of partial content out there, namely the first-degree fragment of R.B. Angell's logic of analytic containment. One of these proof systems (a standard Gentzen-style sequent calculus) we will only talk about in passing. The other, a curious non-standard circuit style proof system with more direct connections to truthmaker semantics will be our main quarry. In particular our focus will be on the different affordances these two proof systems provide in helping us to think about partial content and truthmaker semantics.

Cumming -- Vague Meaning and Rational Classification

Abstract: How should we model the meanings of expressions that are vague in some dimension, as 'tall' is in measured height? If we allow cutoffs at the first or higher orders, then we seem to indulge in false precision. But if we don't, then it doesn't seem possible to derive such straightforward predictions as that 'tall' applies to someone 7' in height. My approach is to leave the meaning vague, and derive classificatory predictions instead from a rational requirement of consistency with a precedent of past judgments. The general, but precise, rational requirement interacts with the vague meaning to provide a verdict in particular cases.

Fine -- Vagueness: Some Epistemological Considerations.  

Abstract:  I argue that the use of vague concepts may force us to be irrational in the judgements that we make.