Metaphysical Realism and the Varieties of Subject-World Correlations in Phenomenology

Richard Sebold (La Trobe University)

ABSTRACT:

At various points in his writings, Edmund Husserl characterizes the task of phenomenology as the investigation into the necessary correlation between the world and (transcendental) subjectivity. He goes so far as to describe what a phenomenologist is to be engaged in as “correlation research”. Moreover, Husserl’s turn toward transcendental idealism can be seen, in light of the central place he grants to the study of subject-object correlation, as giving ultimate priority to the subjective pole of the correlation relation. This is exemplified by avowals such as no sense can be made of any object unless it is correlated with subjectivity. In other words, no subject, no object. And despite their disagreements, Husserl’s phenomenological successors, e.g., Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre, share, to varying degrees, his correlationist commitment. Thus, I would argue that an emphasis on the subject-world correlation is a trait of phenomenology in general.

The problem with the above view is that it seems to put phenomenology at odds with the basic philosophical truth that the world we experience exists mind-independently, i.e., the doctrine of metaphysical realism. In this talk, I will assess the various arguments put forward in favor of the necessary correlation between subjectivity and the world, focusing in particular on Husserl, and will argue that none satisfactorily undermine metaphysical realism. In doing the above, I will outline and spell out different ways in which the phenomenologist may intend that subjectivity is necessarily correlated with the world of objects, identifying three possible interpretations of the correlation: metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic.  Ultimately, the former two are determined to be incompatible with a robust realism, requiring their repudiation by phenomenology if it hopes to be a viable philosophical enterprise. I conclude with some lessons, drawn from the discussion, on the limits of phenomenology.