The Normativity of Logic

Logic tells you what follows from what, it tells you when an argument is valid, and when a theory is inconsistent. So, logic describes what follows from your attitudes, whether your reasoning is valid, and whether your beliefs are consistent. 

It is widely held that in addition logic provides epistemic norms. Logic prescribes what someone with your attitudes ought to believe, how you ought to reason and whether your current epistemic state is permissible. These epistemic norms have authority over mental states and acts akin to how moral norms have authority over ordinary acts. To violate these norms is to do something epistemologically impermissible. It is to be irrational.

In recent years there has been a resurgent interest in the normativity of logic, including attempts at saying clearly what those epistemic norms actually are, and what their import is in cases of belief revision.

Following this trend, this conference is devoted to questions such as:

• In what sense, if any, is logic normative?
• What norms for thinking does logic actually provide?
• What is the connection between evidential norms and the norms provided by logic?
• What is the connection between logic and the aim of belief?