Credence in Psychological Explanation
Neil Sinhababu (National University of Singapore)

February 15, 2017, 10:30am - 12:00pm
Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham

Humanities Building room 425A
900 13th Street South
Birmingham 35294-1260
United States


Joshua May
University of Alabama at Birmingham

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Abstract: Many philosophers understand belief in terms of the subjective probability that a proposition is true, ranging between 0 (certainty in the negation of the proposition) and 1 (certainty of the proposition). Subjective probability, or credence, is frequently used in explaining belief-formation and action. I discuss advantages of using credences in explaining additional psychological phenomena such as ambivalence and the intensity of emotion upon receiving news. I also investigate when we have the experience of calculation, and argue that a credence-based framework helps us explain this. 

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