Reason and Love in Plato or Plato's irrationalism
Vasilis Politis (Trinity College Dublin)

April 26, 2017, 3:00pm - 5:00pm
The Philosophical Society

Engelska Parken 2-1077
Thunbergsvägen 3H
Uppsala 751 26
Sweden

This will be an accessible event, including organized related activities

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  • Uppsala University

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If there is one thing we seem to be immediately certain of in regard to Plato's ethics and psychology, it is that it affords a supreme place to reason. This is evidently true of the apparent intellectualism of some relatively early dialogues, especially Protagoras, in which it is argued that knowledge of what is good is both necessary and sufficient for good action; and hence apparent irrationality is understood as the product of cognitive error. It seems to be true also of the divided soul in Republic, where rational and irrational desires are set against each other in a radical conflict, and rational desire is afforded the task of controlling irrational desire and making sure it does no more than subserve the continuation of our individual existence (through the appetite for food and drink) and the continued existence of the human species (through sexual appetite).

It is generally thought that this is, basically, the whole answer to our question:

What is the place of reason, and its relation to the irrational, in Plato's ethics and psychology?

My aim in this talk is to challege this traditional answer; and, at the risk of excess, to turn it on its head.

In the Phaedrus, when Plato considers the nature of eros and argues that it is such an irrational force in us that it implies the risk of self-destructive madness, he is at pains to demonstrate that a life in which eros is controlled by reason, and in which this risk is opposed at any cost, is empty and vain when compared to a life that gives in to eros even at the risk of self-destructive madness. The basic premises in Plato's argument appear to be these: 1. there is a form of irrationality that is supremely good; 2. this form of irrationality cannot, in the human soul, be neatly separated from the potentially self-destructive form or irrationality, rather, the two opposed forms of irrationality are opposite tendencies of a single force in us; and, 3. eros is of this dual nature.

It certainly appears that Plato's account of eros in the Phaedrus is in logical tension with the traditional answer to our question. However, it is easy to imagine a proponent of the traditional view defending this view by arguing that the inconsistency is only apparent. She may urge that, in Symposium, Plato gives a more considered account of eros, which avoids premises 1-3. Or she may urge that it is not the same concept of irrationality that Plato uses in the Republic, when he demotes irrationality, and that he uses in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, when he elevates the irrationality distinctive of eros.

I don't think these strategies for protecting the traditional view will work. And if they don't work, then the traditional view is mistaken.

What is the correct answer to our question? I conclude that there is a remakable irrationalism in Plato's ethics and psychology. It says that a life based on reason and rational desire, unless this is fed by an irrational force, eros, is empty and vain. This conclusion is consistent with the account, properly understood, of the divided soul of the Republic. Reason has an important controlling and comprehending (hermeneutic) role in relation to irrational desire. But it is not afforded supremacy over the irrational.

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